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Indeed, by comparison wilh PI, the usual approach to property identity^ (PI 1 ) (F)(G)(F=G (a)(b)((a expresses F 6 b expresses G) a is synonymous with b)) (where the innermost quantifiers range over open sentences), seems utterly misguided methodologically. There is little room for semantic considerations in a matter as exclusively ontological as identity.
After all, when we ask whether the Evening Star and the Morning Star are identical we are not inclined to think the question should be answered seniantically. We answer it not by reflecting on the meaning of the expressions "the Evening Star" and "the Morning Star," or on the semantic relations which might hold between them, but by considering the Evening Star and the Morning Star, i_.e. , the objects themselves.
Similarly here. When we ask about identity conditions for properties we want the answer to bear on properties themselves not the holding of some semantic relation between open sentences which express them. That would be changing the subject.
So then we must consider the objects themselves; provided we are prepared to put language and semantics aside and take properties qua objects seriously in the first place, as Plato did. (It is not surprising that Quine and Carnap, neither of whom ever took properties conceived as extra-linquistic objects seriously, are mainly responsible for the prominence of a semantic criterion for property identity.) II Why should philosophers find property identity problematic in the first place?
Possibly as a result of the following process:
(1) they replace the wholly ontological question "When are properties the same?" with the mainly semantic question "When do two open sentences express the same property?," which (2) they in turn replace with the wholly semantic question "When do two open sentences have the same meaning?" (Problems about proposition identity get started the same way.) So the search for a semantic criterion begins and ends quickly in obscurity when doubts about synonymy are raised.
But there is no reason why we must think of properties as meanings.
Plato didn't. Indeed, if doubts about synonymy are justified, we shouldn't so think of I'll properties. That is not to say that meaning is not relevant to properties.
It is, but only in that meaningful open sentences only can be said to express propertiesa connection which hardly implies that properties must be meanings, and hence some sort of linguistic object.
True, even though properties need not be meanings, they are still "intensions." Nothing more mysterious need be intended by this tag, howe ver, than that properties can be exemplified by all and only the same objects, i.e., have the same extension, without being the same, as is the case with being an equilateral triangle and being an equiangular triangle.
How this can be so may be seen by recalling that properties are both exemplifiers and exemplifiees. We do not automatically specify all the properties a property can exemplify when we specify what exemplifies it. Granted.
PI by itself will not do as an account of what a property is. But it is not intended to. Such an account ought to be forthcoming from a full-blown theory of properties, not from a criterion of identity.
It is not the business of a criterion of identity to specify the entity.
As I have already attended to this matter elsewhere,' independently of PI, the cix-cularity objection will not work against me.8 Tor if this world contained non-individuals, it might contain, for example, two sets having all and only the same members (since two sets having all and only the same properties would also have all and only the same members).
But surely this cannot be.
But it seems to me that Black's world is incoherent even as a world of individuals.
Russell was right to define identity as he did, for the following reason. A definition of identity must tell us not only when and only when we have one thing, but also when and only when we have two. That is, on the flip side of a definition of identity there must be one of diversity.
Now, in so far as I understand what diversity is at all, it seems to me that if a is other than b, then there is a property one of them has which the other does not have (never mind how we could know this).
That is what is mean t by saying that we have two things and not one.
But then (LL*) (x)(y)((F)(Fx = Fy) + x=y)
has to hold to give us the concept of diversity by transposition.
In requiring that we give up the necessity of LL* , Black's hypothesis simply robs us of our meaning postulate for diversity.
What we are to put in its place or how we are to understand diversity without LL* I cannot imagine.
Black certainly does not tell us. 11 (iii) "Philosophers must still do extra work to settle the issue of identity for their entity, not because it is difficult to formulate adequate logically sufficient conditions for identity, but because such conditions must also be helpful.
That is, they must tell us also how we are to determine in some particular case whether we have one tiling or two. But LL* and PI* do not do this . "
In the present context the objection is irrelevant, as it raises not an ontological question but an epistemological one.
Unlike the previous objection, the present one does not question the truth of LL* or related principles.
It merely insists that all such principles be able to answer also the question "How do you know that here you have one. tiling and not two?" While this question is interesting and important, it is not one which the Realist must answer to deal with the ontological aspects of identity.
It is, in general, bad method to attach an epistemological rider to a metaphysical question.12
In any case, I don't see why LL* and PI* are not "helpful." According to these principles, if there is a property which a/F has and which b/G does not have, we have two things/properties.
If there is no such property, we have one. This alone will not tell us what properties in particular would be needed or how we are to look for them, but presumably that should be the result of some honest toil and not merely a matter of direct inference from such general principles as LL* and PI*. (The extra work whose analytic value I questioned earlier might come in handy here.) (iv) "The principle LL* that indiscernibles are identical implies that an individual is nothing but a bundle of properties.13
But this view is absurd because it implies that individuals must be abstract. I 1 ' Therefore, LL* is absurd." I agree it is absurd to think of individuals as mere bundles of properties.
But I disagree that LL* implies this view.
For, while on the present view LL* is not compatible with there being no properties, it is perfectly compatible with there being no sets (collections, bundles, etc.), of properties or anything else. Together with LL, LL* merely sets forth the meaning of identity, so that any proposition involving this concept can be paraphrased wholly in terms of property coexemplification.
Such a paraphrase neither dispenses with individuals, in favor of some other entity, nor identifies them with some other entity.
It takes no stand at all on the nature of individuals. Except for identity, it leaves everything else the same. IV I have argued that there is nothing especially obscure about property identity. Whatever be the truth about identity-and here I have argued, with Russell, that Leibniz's Law and its converse jointly exhaust that truth--it holds equally for individuals and non-individuals.
The sole remaining mystery, if we can call it that, is epistemological.
But that is a separate issue, which I may legitimately postpone for another occasion. 
